

Historical roots of the manipulation of religion in Northern Nigeria

The rise of fundamentalist groups and the plight of ethnic and religious minorities

Emmanuel Osewe Akubor¹

Abstract

The manipulation of religion, especially by religious and political leaders, has plagued Nigeria ever since it gained its independence in 1960. The inability of the government and people to check this rising tide has led to religious violence in various parts of the country. This manipulation has led to the emergence of fundamentalist groups who are no longer interested in just creating internal crises but are currently working towards the disintegration of the country and the creation of a religious state. Thus, it is not surprising that the Boko Haram group, which made itself known in 2009, has taken over parts of the northern region. As a result, minorities in these occupied areas are often the target of attacks. These groups are frequently supported by powerful politicians and religious leaders pursuing their own selfish interests. This paper examines how the manipulation of religion in Nigeria since independence has fostered the rise of fundamentalist groups and describes the serious dangers facing minorities in the affected areas in particular and the nation of Nigeria in general.

Keywords: Religion, fundamentalism, religious minorities, Nigeria.

1. Introduction

Since the 1980s, religious crises have become a recurring part of life in northern Nigeria, affecting nearly every one of the 19 states that constitute this region. Some of the sources of the frustrations and criminal behaviour underlying these crises are clear: ethnic and religious division, sociological and economic alienation due to widespread poverty and unemployment. But other forces are involved whose identity and character are difficult to define.

Many people have died, sustained serious injuries, lost property, and/or become permanently dislocated and psychologically depressed as a result of these clashes, which pose a severe threat to public safety and citizens' rights. Furthermore, through either miscarriage of justice or the government's failures to prosecute the

¹ Emmanuel Osewe Akubor teaches history at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria. Email: oseweakubor@gmail.com. Article received: 24 June 2015; accepted: 14 January 2020.

perpetrators and instigators of these clashes, thousands of Nigerians have been unjustly treated.

2. Intergroup relations before the emergence of Islam and Christianity

Although clashes between the two dominant world religions of Islam and Christianity have occurred periodically, there is no precedent in Nigeria for the type of skirmishes experienced today. This is because the various groups that inhabited the area traditionally viewed religion as a tool to promote unity, social stability and integration (Parrinder 1969; Kukah 2007).

Smith (1987, cited in Kwanashie et al., 1987) described the pre-Islamic Hausa land as a country of people who were dedicated to the worship of *Iskoki* (spirits), especially on the small mountains of Kano and Zaria. According to his analysis, the worship at these inselbergs provided fertile ground for the emergence of the society in which the jihadists later established Islam. In this way, Smith demonstrated that religion aided the substantial integration of people who came from different places to worship and later formed indivisible communities. In the southern part of Nigeria, before the arrival of Islam or Christianity, tribal religions cemented relationships and served as a tool for development. This is seen by the fact that worshippers of the different earth goddesses and priests and priestesses of similar deities had to come together to perform functions aimed at either purifying the land and its people, warning of impending danger or performing rituals to ask for a bountiful harvest (Afigbo, 1981).

3. Islam, Christianity and their co-existence in Nigeria since 1960

The socio-political situation in Nigeria since 1960 reminds one of the comment by Chief Awolowo, a post-colonial leader, that "Nigeria is a mere geographical expression." Nigeria's political independence was not gained with the full agreement and mutual satisfaction of all its regions. Bitterness persists even today in some parts of the country. Historical documents contain ample evidence of advocacy against, as well as in favour of, independence. Some areas saw considerable, open rejection of the call of independence, because of the fear that one region would dominate others. Such fears have proved to be well grounded. As François Duvalier, then president of Haiti, said in 1969, Nigeria has never since its independence shown the distinctive marks of a united nation. The country has been unable to quell tribal rivalries and achieve the cultural blending required to forge national unity (Onwudiwe 2011).

Duvalier's observation may have been based on his observation of the utterances and actions of Nigeria's political and religious leaders, who according to Usman (1979) were interested in religion only so that they could manipulate it for other purposes. Sir Ahmadu Bello (premier of Northern Nigeria until his assassination

in 1966) and some other leaders gave the impression, in various settings, that the marriage that resulted in the country of Nigeria is unholy and must not be accepted (Paden, 1986). They have suggested that one religion or group is superior to the others and that, as such, the others should be perpetually enslaved and subservient. This negative perception of fellow citizens could also be partly responsible for the promotion of the present crises in the country.

4. The numbers game and heightened tensions

At various times in Nigeria's history, there has been debate over which religious population actually dominates the others. For example, in 1988, while reporting the riot that greeted the appointment of Ibrahim Dasuki as Sultan of Sokoto, the seat of the Caliphate in West Africa, both the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Voice of America described the Sultan as the spiritual head of the Muslims of Nigeria, who (they stated) consisted of 40% of the population. Within a week, letters and official condemnation of such a low reported percentage followed. The responses claimed that 70% to 80% of the population were Muslims.

Earlier, in 1986, Abubakar Gumi said that Nigeria was 80% Muslim, 5% Christian, and 15% others. When he received the King Faisal Prize in 1987, he claimed a 70% Muslim population for the country (IPA, 1989:16). In sharp contrast, Tijani Ibrahim (1989) argued that in Nigeria about 47% of the people were Muslims, 34% were Christians and 1% followed traditional religion. Recently it was claimed that there are 78 million Muslims in Nigeria, representing 5% of all Islamic adherents in the world (IPA, 1989:16). Usman Faruk, a former military governor of North-West state during General Yakubu Gowon's regime, argued (at Sheik Ahmad Gumi's Ramadan sermon at the Sultan Bello Mosque in Kaduna on 13 August 2012) that Nigeria had 120 million Muslims and only 50 million people of other faiths. These claims and counter-claims are all attempts at manipulating the people against one another. The immediate result has been the emergence of fundamentalist groups who have felt that the religion of the supposed majority should be forced on others.

5. The rise of fundamentalist groups and Nigeria's fragile unity: From Maitastine to Jama'atu Ahliss-Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad (Boko Haram)

5.1 The Maitatsine group

The Maitatsine group, named after the late Malam Muhammadu Marwa (also known as Allah Ta-Tsine or Maitatsine), initiated modern Nigeria's age of religious terrorism and fanaticism through the riots it fomented in the early 1980s (Yakub, 1992). Espousing an ideology that opposed most aspects of modernization and all

Western influence, the group unleashed acts of terrorism against the state. It also decried such technological commonplaces as radios, wrist watches, automobiles, motorcycles and even bicycles. Those who used these items or read books other than the Qur'an were viewed as hell-bound.

The first Maitatsine violence in Kano shocked many Nigerians to their marrow. In that crisis period, 4,177 lives were lost. The Kano incident stands out as the first Nigerian religious crisis to claim a huge toll in human lives and property. Although there had been a series of religious tensions and skirmishes across the country, including one in May 1980 in Zaria during which property belonging mainly to Christians was destroyed by some Muslims, the Maitatsine riots were at an unforeseen level. Most people could not imagine why differences in religion could lead to such wanton destruction of lives and property as occurred at Kano in December 1980 (Kumolu 2011).

The Maitatsine uprising has been described as the gateway to religious strife in Nigeria. Subsequent violent outbursts and religious riots have included the following:

- The Maitatsine uprising at Kano, Kaduna and Maiduguri in October 1982
- The Maitatsine uprising at Yola, February 1984
- The Maitatsine uprising at Gombe, April 1985
- The conflict in Kafanchan, Kaduna, Zaria and parts of Kaduna state, March 1987
- The conflict in Tafawa Balewa and other parts of Bauchi state in 1991, and again in 2000–2001
- The conflicts in Zango Kataf and other parts of Kaduna state from February to May 1992
- The conflicts in Kano state in 1999–2000
- The conflict in the Kaduna metropolis in 2000
- The Kano “Anti-American war in Afghanistan” riot of September–October 2001
- The *Sharia Dole* (Sharia is compulsory) conflict of 18 June 2001
- The conflict in the Jos metropolis and its environs in 2001–2002
- The conflict on the Mambila Plateau in 2001–2002
- The conflict in Gwantu, Kaduna state in 2001
- The Anti–Miss World conflict in Kaduna state, 2002–2003
- The Jos crisis/religious conflicts of November 2008 and 2010
- The Boko Haram uprising in Maiduguri and Bauchi, 2009
- The Kalakatu religious conflict in Bauchi, 2009

5.2 Jama'atu Ahliss-Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad (Boko Haram) and the Nigerian State

Jama'atu Ahliss-Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad, also known as Boko Haram (meaning “Western education is a sin”), is a Salafist Muslim sect that was founded around

2002 and became jihadist in 2009. It rejects Western education and forbids its members from working in any government establishment. The name Boko Haram may have been given to the group by members of the Hausa-speaking public because of its prominent opposition to Western education (Akubor, 2011). This organization also promotes separatism based on ethnic and sectarian intolerance, and it is the leading proponent of terror in Nigeria today. The original name is an Arabic phrase meaning "Group Committed to Propagating the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad." The group, originally based in the northeastern part of Nigeria, has spread its wings to other areas, especially the northwest, threatening the peace and stability of the entire country.

At its inception, Boko Haram was involved mostly in fomenting sectarian violence. Its adherents participated in simple attacks on Christians using clubs, machetes and small arms. The group gained international attention following a serious outbreak of inter-communal violence in 2008 and 2009 that resulted in thousands of deaths. Since that time, Boko Haram has continually attacked those who oppose its teachings and doctrines. Table 1 summarizes the attacks mounted in 2011 and 2012 in detail, with general reference to the ongoing violence Boko Haram has sustained since then.

A critical analysis of the modus operandi of the fundamentalist groups and their related allies shows clearly that they are on a genocide mission. A group bent on genocide, like the Hutus of Rwanda in their genocide against the Tutsis, starts by identifying the ethnic or national group they wish to annihilate. Then they use media propaganda effectively to arouse hatred against this target group. The propaganda helps in brainwashing militant youth, who are organized into militia to exterminate the target group. Taking control of the national or ethnic group whose fanatical militants are being prepared to perpetuate genocide also entails the elimination of rational and liberal members of that group who are opposed to genocide. They are called traitors from within, as the militants generate extreme tension, crisis and fear within both the target group and their own group. In most cases, they capitalize on a serious national crisis – economic or political – to unleash their violence on innocent people. In doing so, those who are placed in strategic state institutions use those institutions, whether national or local, to assist in the implementation of their genocide (Destexhe 1995; Prunier 1995).

6. The politics of the widening Christian-Muslim divide since 1999

Maier (2000) argued that the relationship between Nigerian Christians and Muslims took a devastating turn with the return of democracy in 1999, when several northern governors openly called for the imposition of the complete Islamic legal system known as Sharia, including its penalties of amputation and floggings and its strict code

	Date	Target	Implement	Result
1	26 Aug. 2011	UN headquarters, Abuja	Suicide bomber	Scores killed and UN building destroyed
2	22 Sept. 2011	Mandala, Niger State	Unknown	Five Igbo traders killed for inability to recite Qur'an
3	4 Nov. 2011	Maiduguri, Potiskum and Kaduna	Explosives, guns and suicide bomber	Over 160 lives lost and properties destroyed
4	Dec. 2011	Oriapkata, Kaduna	Explosives	Scores injured and killed
5	12 Dec. 2011	Mando, Kaduna	Explosives	Scores injured, building destroyed
6	Dec. 2011	Yobe and Maiduguri	Explosives and raids	Policemen and others injured and killed
7	25 Dec. 2011	St Theresa Catholic Church, Mandalla, Niger State	Explosives	Worshippers and residents injured and killed
8	25 Dec. 2011	Yobe and Plateau states	Explosives	People killed
9	1 Jan. 2012	Winners Chapel, Sapele Road, Benin	Planted explosives	Foiled, suspects arrested
10	5 Jan. 2012	Deeper Life Church, Gombe	Guns (attack during worship inside church)	6 killed, 10 injured
11	5 Jan. 2012	Adamawa State	Gunmen	4 Christian/Igbo traders killed
12	6 Jan. 2012	Christ Apostolic Church, Jimeta Yola	Boko Haram gunmen	8 killed
13	6 Jan. 2012	Mubi, Adamawa State	Boko Haram gunmen	About 20 Igbo/Christians killed during a town hall meeting
14	6 Jan. 2012	Adamawa State	Boko Haram gunmen	Killed kinsmen of murdered Christians planning burial rites
15	7 Jan. 2012	University of Maiduguri	Boko Haram gunmen	2 Christian students killed
16	7 Jan. 2012	Larmurde, Adamawa	Boko Haram gunmen	7 Christians killed on their way out of Adamawa
17	22 Jan. 2012	St Theresa Catholic Church and Evangelical Church Tafawa Balewa	Explosives	No lives lost
18	29 April 2012	Bayero University Kano, Old Campus	Guns and explosives	Worshippers killed including students and 2 professors
19	2012-2015	Maiduguri and Yobe	Guns and explosives	Many people killed

Table 1: Attacks on People and Places by Boko Haram since 2011

of sexual segregation. They did so without taking into consideration the religious composition of the area, which had Muslims and Christians living side by side.

Sharia was first implemented by the government of Zamfara state under Yerima Bakura, followed immediately by the government of Niger state and more than a dozen other northern states. Those who supported this movement told their Muslim supporters that living under the Sharia system is an intrinsic right and duty of the Islamic faithful, and that any Muslim who opposed it was lacking in true belief. On the other hand, Christians within these territories, as well as those Muslims who doubted the wisdom of pressing for Sharia, saw this effort as an attempt to undermine the Christians in the area. The argument that Sharia would not affect non-Muslims was seen as largely false; for example, the ban on the sale of alcohol, cinemas and integration of the sexes in most spheres of public life would affect everyone irrespective of religion and tribe. The resulting controversy set the people openly against each other, leading to hundreds of deaths and the burning and looting of businesses in many areas of northern Nigeria (Maier 2000).

Yahaya (2007) corroborated Maier's reports, noting that the losses in monetary terms could have funded a substantial programme of development projects. He indicated that the bloody clash in Kaduna in the year 2000 not only led to a major breakdown of inter-group relations, but also claimed 1,295 lives and saw the destruction of 1,944 buildings (including 123 churches and 55 mosques) and 746 vehicles. A large number of residents fled, making Kaduna seem like a ghost town for a long time and initiating the unplanned division of Kaduna metropolis into the Muslim north and Christian south.

In the midst of counter-attacks that led to an estimated 400 deaths of Muslims in the northern city of Aba, the Kano state government proceeded to enact the Sharia bill into law on 27 February 2000, just two days before an emergency meeting that the President had called to look into the matter. Several other states, including Yobe, Borno and Sokoto, were actively considering similar measures at this time. The Christian business communities in the north argued that these laws were intended to attack them and their businesses, and subsequent events seem to have confirmed their fears. For example, in March 2010 the Kano Hisbah (a religious police force) destroyed 34,000 bottles of confiscated alcohol. Kano state has also maintained steep fines and prison sentences for the public consumption and distribution of alcohol, in compliance with its Sharia statutes. Hisbah has been accused of harassing non-residents as well as non-Muslim residents of Kano state who were transporting alcoholic beverages on federal roads in Kano. Furthermore, on 1 March 2010, the Kano State Censorship Board cancelled a three-night international music festival that had been hosted by the French embassy for six consecutive years. They argued that the event included a musician who had previously spoken

out against the board's censorship of certain music in Kano state (US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010). Some scholars have also objected to the use of state funds to support one religious group over others, because the state government constructed 75 Juma'a (Friday) and 65 hamsu-salawat (general) mosques between 2005 and 2006 (Haruna 2010) but did not construct a single building for a church or even for Christian interdenominational affairs.

7. Religious manipulation and the plight of northern minorities and other ethnic nationalities

Although Islam is widely practiced in northern Nigeria, the emergence of fundamentalist groups in this part of the country has led to major adulteration and manipulation of Islamic teaching, such that extreme views have gradually come to be seen as amongst the basic tenets of the religion. One impact of this evolution has been the oppression of those who have refused to accept these extreme teachings. The objectors have been marginalized in society and referred to as *Kaafir* (infidels) or *Maguzawa* (unbelievers). Whereas the term *Kaafir* (or *kufir* or *Kuffar*) is used to describe non-believers in Islam generally, *Maguzawa* is used for indigenous people who have refused to accept the Muslim religion and as such are viewed as infidels (Akubor and Musa 2018). The *Kaafir* are often left alone to live in their own separate area, so that they don't influence other people and their religious practice, but the *Maguzawa* face active discrimination politically, economically, socially and educationally. They have been denied official permission to build their own schools or to engage in other development activities due to their religious affiliation. These forms of discrimination and lack of opportunity appear to be part of a plan by a portion of the northern oligarchy to maintain control over minorities in the north (Akubor and Musa 2018). In other cases, educational institutions that were established by local residents or missionaries have been shut down (Kukah 2012). One school located in the Igabi Local Government Area of Kaduna state, which was predominantly a Christian community, was converted into an Islamic school and all the Christian students were sent home (Anfani 2001).

Religious minorities, especially the *Maguzawa*, have been intentionally denied job opportunities. Anfani (2001) provided the following example:

In Kaduna State, an advertisement was placed for job vacancy where there were 54 spaces on the notice board in one of the ministries in Kaduna State. According to the source, even though the interview was done with lots of inconsistencies, only 38 names were listed as people who got the vacancies, of which only four were Christians from the southern part of Kaduna. From the northern part of Kaduna no single one who is a Christian was taken. . . . For example, in Kaduna State, when the

forms were sent to one local government chairman he said he has no Joshua, no Elijah and no Samuel [a reference to Christians and Christian names] in his local government so he will not sign it and up till today after making that report, only Kaduna State was purported to have received the forms. All other states have not received the forms. The same thing with the poverty alleviation program.

Land use rights have been a closely related issue. The Islamic fundamentalist groups still hold firmly to the colonial policy of divide-and-rule and the setting up of separate settlements for non-indigenes; in addition, indigenous members of the minority religion are continually being denied access to land. This was the case with the Tundun Wada and Sabongari settlements, to which indigenous people, displaced inhabitants of the city and non-indigenous immigrants subject to the native administration were restricted, while the ancient walled cities were meant for the indigenous Muslims (Akubor and Akinwale 2014:20). During the colonial period, this provision was intended to prevent people of other religions and ethnic nationalities from mixing freely with the indigenes, as the latter group was considered more radical and a 'bad influence.' Ibe (1998:5) argued that in this way, the colonial British approved of the subjugation of the northern minorities and refused to allow the liberating and empowering message of Christianity to be preached to them. Even today, the minorities who are also indigenes are denied access to land to build religious places of worship or schools that do not promote the major religion (Kukah 2018). Moreover, the Catholic Poverty Reduction Project had its house destroyed and a stern warning was sent to the organization not to attempt to reconstruct the building. Akinwale (2016) wrote:

To be a Christian in Sokoto Diocese is to face the challenge of witnessing. . . . There is the insecurity of Churches and of those who worship in them. By now one would have lost count of how many times the Church and the Rectory in the town of Funtua have been burnt. On December 31, 1988, the Church of St Jude in Chafe was burnt. It has been rebuilt and burnt on at least one other occasion. . . . I recall the demolition of the Church in Isa. The location of the Cathedral of the Holy Family, hidden behind buildings, gives the impression that the Church in Sokoto is a Church in the catacombs. For decades, the city of Sokoto was a city with only one Catholic Church.

There is also the issue of forced marriage and conversion, especially in the core northern part of the country under the guise of religion (Elizabeth 2009). Most often these acts are perpetrated by highly placed politicians and religious leaders who hide under the garb of religion. For instance, *The Guardian* reported that "Senator Ahmed Sani Yerima, representative of Zamfara West in northern Nigeria, made headlines back in 2010 when he married a 13-year-old Egyptian girl. Three years later he persuaded his fellow senators to defeat a motion that would have removed

a constitutional loophole according to which girls under age 18 are considered adults as soon as they get married” (Sandler Clarke 2015). Others have followed Yerima’s lead, as shown in Table 2.

Even better known than these cases are the 276 missing Chibok girls kidnapped by Boko Haram in 2015 from their schools in Borno and Yobe states. In all these cases, the perpetrators of these acts were able to manipulate religious teaching in connivance with highly placed religious scholars and leaders.

These cases of forced underage marriage highlight a broader problem, as Nigeria has among the highest child marriage rates in the world. In Northern Nigeria, about 45% of girls are married – usually against their will – by age 15 and 73% by age 18. Adults who force such teenage girl brides into marriage hide under the guise of religion and tradition to carry out such practices, which are further fuelled by poverty, ignorance and illiteracy (Arukaino 2016). This contravenes the law of the land in light of the Child Rights Act of 2003, which raised the minimum age of marriage for girls to 18. But the legislation, which was created at the federal level, takes effect only if also approved by state governments. To date, only 24 of Nigeria’s 36 states have passed the act (Sandler Clarke 2015).

8. The impact on northern minorities and national unity

It is clear that the basis for Nigeria’s unity has been compromised and that the country, if the crisis is not well managed, could be heading for self-destruction. Most Nigerians are now apprehensive of the activities of Islamic fundamentalists

	Name of Victim	Age	Place	Case	Year
1	Lucy Ejeh	13	Zamfara	Forced marriage, conversion	2009
2	Patience Paul	Not stated	Abducted in Benue, married off in Sokoto	Forced marriage, conversion	2010
3	Marian Yerima (Egyptian)	13	Zamfara	Not stated	2010
4	Ifeoma Odugisi	14	Zaria	Forced marriage, conversion	2014
5	Blessing Gopep	13	Bauchi	Forced marriage, conversion	2015
6	Linda Christopher	16	Bauchi	Forced marriage, conversion	2015

Table 2: Cases of Forced Marriage, Conversion and Change of Name

and their constant threat to the corporate existence of the nation, and as such, a cross-section of Nigerians, especially from the southern part of the country as well as the northern minorities, are clamouring for the disintegration of the country. For example, in the religious realm, the Christian Association of Nigeria (the umbrella body for Christians in Nigeria) through its Secretary General has warned of retaliation that may lead to large-scale destruction and religious war, which Nigeria may not survive (Cocks and Onuah 2011).

Furthermore, ethnic militia groups have emerged in various parts of the country. For instance, in the north central area the Akhwat Akwop claims to represent the minor northern tribes and the Christian minority. Northern Christians and non-indigenes have disassociated themselves from this group, but in view of the high rate of reprisal killings in some parts of the country, especially the Jos area, one is forced to assume that the battle lines have already been drawn. In southwestern Nigeria, the O'odua Peoples Congress (OPC) asked all Yoruba indigenes to leave the north and return home. Similarly, the Igbo group Ogbunigwe Ndigbo also asked all Muslims (especially those of northern extraction) to leave the southeast part of Nigeria or face mass killings. Other militant groups include the Indigenous People of Biafra, the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra and the Niger Delta Liberation Force.

Also, the National Youth Service Corps, which since the 1970s has acted as a catalyst for youth and national integration, has been greatly threatened by the activities of the dreaded Boko Haram sect, as corps members serving in most parts of northern Nigeria have been killed at random. As a result, youths from other parts of Nigeria have threatened to boycott national service henceforth.

9. Conclusion

From the foregoing, it is clear that Nigeria is facing serious security threats. The people of Nigeria, irrespective of their ethnic group, region or religion, should become much more alert and united and should work to expose and reject all forces aimed at destabilizing and destroying the nation's hard-earned democracy and its already fragile economy. Nigerians should be able to see through the activities and utterances of the fundamentalist groups and their related allies both within and outside the country, and they should be more active in promoting and defending inter-ethnic and inter-religious harmony within the country, as mutual co-operation has so much to offer to all of Nigeria's people.

Integration has progressed far enough in Nigeria that any attempt to legitimize the activities of the fundamentalists and their confused ideology would result in all of Nigeria sinking. The bitter experiences that the country has passed through and survived, from the struggle for independence through civil war and a period of


military dictatorship, indicate that Nigerians can still stand together. However, this can be achieved only once we are able to set all religious sentiments aside and be honest and frank about the role of the fundamentalist sects and their destabilization of Nigeria.

References

- Afigbo, A. E. 1981. "The Beni Mirage" and the history of south central Nigeria. *Nigeria Magazine*. Vol. 137, Federal Ministry of Sports and Culture, Lagos: 17-24.
- Akinwale, A. 2016. Are there Christians in Sokoto? A history of Catholicism in the Caliphate. Paper presented at the Synod of the Diocese of Sokoto, 21–24 September 2016.
- Akubor, E. O. 2011. Civil unrest in northern Nigeria: Beyond the literal "Boko Haram." *The Constitution: A Journal of Constitutional Development*, Centre for Constitutionalism and Demilitarisation (CENCOD), Lagos. 11, no. 4 (December): 71–93.
- Akubor, E. O., and Akinwale, A. 2014. Sowing in the desert: Birth and growth of the Catholic Diocese of Sokoto. Nigeria: Catholic Diocese of Sokoto.
- Akubor, E. O., and Musa, Gerald. 2018. The Maguzawa and Nigerian citizenship: Reflecting on identity politics and the national question in Africa. *Ufabamu: A Journal of African Studies* 41(1): 65–80.
- Anfani, M. J. 2001. Split the core North. *Post Express*, 4 May.
- Arukaino, U. 2016. Stolen child brides: Nigeria's hidden, ignored epidemic. *Punch*, 13 March.
- Clark, S. 2004. Early marriage and HIV risks in sub-Saharan Africa. *Studies in Family Planning* 35(3): 149–58.
- Cocks, T., and Onuah, F. 2011. Northern Nigerian Christians warn of religious war. Reuters, 27 December 2011.
- Destexhe, Alan. 1995. *Rwanda and genocide in the twentieth century*. London: Pluto Press.
- Ibe, Cyril. 1998. *Church and humanization, a viable possibility: The case of the Maguzawa of Nigeria*. Sokoto, Nigeria: Catholic Bishops' House.
- Institute of Pastoral Affairs. 1989. Trends in Nigerian Christian-Muslim relations. Seminar on Contemporary Islam and Nigeria, Jos, Nigeria, 13–15 November.
- Kukah, M. H. 2007. *The church and the politics of social responsibility*. Kaduna: Sovereign Print.
- Kukah, M. H. 2018. Threats to the Christian faith in contemporary Nigeria. Keynote address at a conference of the Catholic Men's Guild, Archdiocese of Lagos, 16 June.
- Kumolu, Charles. 2011. How Maitatsine raised curtain for militancy. *Vanguard*, 17 June.
- Maier, K. 2000. *This house has fallen: Nigeria in crisis*. London: Penguin.
- Onwudiwe, O. 2011. The North and the continued existence of Nigeria: The politics of change and revolution. *African Herald Express*, 18 July.
- Paden, J. 1986. *Ahmadu Bello Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and leadership in Nigeria*. Zaria, Nigeria: Hudahuda Publishing Company.

- Parrinder, G. 1969. *Africa's three religions*. London: Sheldon Press.
- Prunier, Gerard. 1995. *The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Sandler Clarke, J. 2015. Nigeria: Child brides facing death sentences a decade after child marriage prohibited. *The Guardian*, 11 March, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/mar/11/the-tragedy-of-nigerias-child-brides>.
- Smith, A. 1987. The early states of the Central Sudan, in *A little new light: Selected writings of Abdullahi Smith*, edited by G. Kwanashie et al. Zaria, Nigeria: Abdullahi Smith Centre for Historical Research.
- Stewart, Scott. 2012. Nigeria's Boko Haram militants remain a regional threat. *The Nation*, 30 January.
- US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2010. Restrictions on religious freedom, Shari'a: Christians suffer religious persecution in Northern Nigeria.
- Usman, Y. B. 1979. *For the liberation of Nigeria: Essays and lectures 1969–1978*. London: Beacon.
- Yahaya, A. 2007. Socio-political conflicts in the Central Nigerian Area: A historical inquiry into the metropolitan Sharia conflict, in *Historical perspectives on Nigeria's post-colonial conflicts*, edited by Olayemi Akinwumi, Satu Fwatshak and Okpeh Okpeh. Lagos: Historical Society of Nigeria.
- Yakub, I. 1992. The Maitatsine saga. *The Bloom*, 5(1), February.

Global Declarations on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Human Rights



by Thomas K. Johnson,
Thomas Schirrmacher,
Christof Sauer (eds.)

(WEA GIS, Vol. 18) ISBN 978-3-86269-135-7
Bonn, 2017. 117 pp., €12.00 via book trade

Free
online

www.iirf.eu